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ABSTRACT
This article examines a recent decision of the ECJ on state derogation from the age discrimination principle contained
in  the  Employment  Equality  (‘Framework’)  Directive  2000/78/EC.  The  case,  Palacios  de  la  Villa  v.  Cortefiel
Servicios SA, originating from Spain, involved  a  challenge  to  legislation  permitting  for  compulsory  retirement  in
collective  agreements.  It  also  examines  a  similar  British  challenge,  due  in  the  ECJ   sometime   in   2009,   and
comparative case law from the United States, where federal age discrimination law has been in  place  since  1967.   It
concludes that (1)  the  decision  in  Palacios  de  la  Villa,  rejecting  the  challenge,  departed  from  established  ECJ
jurisprudence and signalled a new deference to derogation in the field of age discrimination; (2) is out of line with US
law; and (3) in any case should not threaten  the  British  challenge.  However,  it  also  concludes  that  lawmakers  in
Europe and the US generally consider age discrimination to be a lesser wrong than discrimination on other grounds.
INTRODUCTION
The  Employment  Equality  (‘Framework’)  Directive  2000/78/EC  imposed   an   obligation   on
member states to outlaw employment  discrimination  on  the  ground  of  age  (as  well  as  sexual
orientation, religion or belief, and disability). In the UK, the age strand  was  implemented  by  the
Employment  Equality  (Age   Discrimination)   Regulations   2006[i]   (the   ‘Age   Regulations’).
Workers with perhaps the  highest  expectation  of  the  regulations  were  those  wishing  to  work
beyond their customary retirement age. However, this expectation was dashed by the  inclusion  of
a major exemption that permits employers to retire workers in much the same way that they  could
before the regulations came into force. Regulation 30 provides a default retirement  age  for  those
aged 65[ii] or over.[iii] It permits employers to dismiss workers who have reached 65,  so  long  as
they follow a complex procedure (set out in schedule 6), but no reason other than  retirement  need
be given. Should employers agree to keep on a worker beyond  65,  the  general  principle  against
age discrimination will apply, save for  retirement.  For  instance,  discriminatory  discipline,  pay,
harassment,  and  job  classification  against  those  working  beyond  their  retirement  age  would
remain unlawful.
An interest group for older workers is challenging this  exemption  as  being  incompatible
with the parent Directive. This has become known as the Heyday challenge, after an interest group
involved in the case,[iv] although its  formal  title  is  R  (on  the  application  of  the  Incorporated
Trustees of the National Council for Ageing  (Age  Concern  England))  v.  Secretary  of  State  for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.[v] A hearing is due in  the  ECJ  sometime  in  2009.
The challenge appears to have suffered a setback by the recent judgment of the ECJ in another age
discrimination case, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA (2007).[vi] This was a  challenge
to a Spanish exemption from the age discrimination  principle  permitting  compulsory  retirement
ages to be negotiated in collective agreements. The ECJ dismissed the challenge and held that  the
Spanish measure was compatible with the Directive.
This note examines that decision, focusing on the whether the  exemption  was  objectively
justified, compares  it  with  long-standing  United  States  jurisprudence,  and  concludes  that  the
decision departed from established ECJ jurisprudence, is out of line with US law, and in  any  case
should  not  threaten  the  Heyday  challenge.  However,  it  also  shows  how   the   law   generally
considers age discrimination as a lesser wrong than discrimination on other grounds.
THE LEGISLATION
The EU and domestic legislation relevant to Palacios de la Villa is as follows. Article 2(1)  of  the
Framework Directive provides that in the field of employment the ‘“principle of  equal  treatment”
shall mean that there shall  be  no  direct  or  indirect  discrimination  whatsoever’  on  grounds  of
religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation, and age. The definitions of  discrimination  follow
the models developed by the ECJ and used in the Equal Treatment (sex) and Race  Directives.[vii]
Thus, the Directive carries standard definitions of direct and indirect  discrimination.  Article  4(1)
provides the now standard exception for  ‘genuine  and  determining  occupational  requirements.’
This allows employers to discriminate directly when a particular age  is  necessary  for  the  job  in
question. In addition, article 6(1) provides the standard defence of objective  justification,  tailored
for age:
Member  States  may  provide  that  differences  of   treatment   on   grounds   of   age   shall   not   constitute
discrimination, if, within the context  of  national  law,  they  are  objectively  and  reasonably  justified  by  a
legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour  market  and  vocational  training  objectives,
and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.[viii]
The striking feature of article 6 is that it applies to direct, as  well  as  indirect,  discrimination.  This  is  not
possible on other grounds, such as race or sex. It permits  facially  discriminatory  practices  to  be
justified for reasons unrelated to the job in question.
Finally, Recital 14 of the preamble, states: ‘This  Directive  shall  be  without  prejudice  to
national provisions laying down retirement ages.’
Three Spanish measures became pertinent to this case: (1) the ‘original measure’, (2)  Law
14/2005, and (3) the ‘transitional measure’.  The  original  measure,  passed  in  1980,  provided  a
maximum working  age  of  69  years,  and  allowed  compulsory  retirement  to  be  negotiated  in
collective agreements, with the single condition that the worker had made sufficient  contributions
to qualify for a retirement pension. This  measure  was  repealed  in  2001  as  Government  policy
shifted from encouraging employment to easing the burden of  state  pension  payments  to  retired
workers.
In 2005, Law 14/2005 reinstated the exemption. Two conditions were attached.  First,  as  before,  no
one could be retired until they qualified for a retirement pension. Second, the agreement had to  be
in pursuit of an employment policy, ‘such as increased stability in employment, the conversion  of
temporary contracts into permanent  contracts,  sustaining  employment,  the  recruitment  of  new
workers, or any other objectives aimed at promoting the quality of employment’.  It  was  apparent
at this time that the status of compulsory retirement clauses  negotiated  during  the  interim  years
was uncertain. This had led to  many  disputes.  To  resolve  these,  a  ‘transitional’  measure  with
retrospective effect was attached to Law 14/2005. It permitted  compulsory  retirement  clauses  in
collective agreements negotiated between 2001 and 2005. The transitional measure  differed  from
Law 14/2005 because only one condition was attached,  that  no  one  could  be  retired  until  they
qualified for a retirement  pension.  Thus,  the  original  and  transitional  measures  each  had  one
condition (pension qualification) attached, whilst Law 14/2005 had two (pension qualification and
an employment policy aim).
FACTS AND DECISION
Felix Palacios de la Villa, aged 65, was ‘retired’ under a  collective  agreement  negotiated  during
the period covered by the transitional measure,  and  so  the  issue  in  this  case  was  whether  the
transitional measure complied with the Framework Directive.
The Spanish Government  defended  the  measure  on  two  grounds.  The  first  was  that  by  recital  14,  the
directive had no application at all to compulsory retirement measures. Although the  Advocate-General  accepted  this
argument,[ix] it was  rejected  tersely  by  the  ECJ,  holding  that  the  recital  ‘merely  states  that  the
directive does not affect the competence of the Member  States  to  determine  retirement  age  and
does not in any way preclude the application of that directive to national  measures  governing  the
conditions for termination of employment contracts  where  the  retirement  age,  thus  established,
has been reached.’[x]
               The second and successful argument was that the  measure  was  objectively  justified  under  article  6.  The
difficulty for this defence was the absence of the  ‘second’  condition  (of  promoting  an  employment  policy)  in  the
transitional measure. In isolation, the transitional measure did not appear to be in pursuit of an employment policy,  or
a ‘legitimate aim’, the primary requirement for objective justification. However, the Court took account of the context
of  the  measure.  First,  the  original  measure  was  expressed  to  create  vacancies  at  a  time  of   high
unemployment.[xi] Second, there was evidence that the transitional  measure  was  adopted  at  the
instigation   of   trade   unions   and   employers’   organisations,   to    promote    intergenerational
employment.[xii] Third, Law 14/2005 was enacted once again with the cooperation of trade unions
and employers’ organisations, this time  with  an  expressed  variety  of  employment  policy  aims
(listed above).[xiii] And fourth, the compulsory retirement clause in the  collective  agreement  was
expressed to be ‘In the interests of promoting employment.’[xiv]
The Court reasoned, ‘placed  in  its  context,  the  ...  transitional  provision  was  aimed  at
regulating   the   national   labour   market,    in    particular,    for    the    purposes    of    checking
unemployment.’[xv] Hence the measure, and the collective agreement, fulfilled a legitimate aim.
The next matter for the Court was whether the measure was ‘appropriate and necessary’  to  achieve  the  aim
(‘proportionality’). To this purpose, the court noted the ‘broad discretion’ afforded to member  states,  employers  and
trade unions, in their choice and  definition  of  measures  capable  of  achieving  a  legitimate  social  or
employment policy,[xvi] which allows for ‘specific provisions which may vary in accordance  with
the situation in Member States.’[xvii]
More specifically, the Court stated: ‘It does not appear  unreasonable  for  ...  a  Member  State  to
take the view that a measure ... may be appropriate and necessary in order to achieve  a  legitimate
aim in the context of national employment policy, consisting in the promotion of full  employment
by facilitating access to the labour market.’[xviii] Further, the transitional measure did not  ‘unduly
prejudice’ workers of retirement  age  because  compulsory  retirement  was  subject  to  a  worker
being entitled to a retirement pension, ‘the level of which  cannot  be  regarded  as  unreasonable.’
‘Moreover’,  the  measure  enabled  trade  unions  and  employers’  organisations  to  agree   ‘with
considerable flexibility’  a  compulsory  retirement  mechanism  that  took  account  of  the  labour
market concerned, and the specific features of the jobs in question.[xix]
Thus, the Court concluded, the transitional  measure  (and  the  collective  agreement)  was
objectively justified and so compatible with the Directive.
COMMENT
On Recital 14, the ECJ’s decision undoubtedly is correct  and  is  supported  by  the  rule  that  the
main body of a directive prevails over the preamble.[xx] Clearly, a broad reading of Recital  14,  as
urged by the Spanish  Government  and  the  Advocate-General,  was  inconsistent  with  the  anti-
discrimination rubric in article 2,  and  had  no  counterpart  in  the  main  body.  Thus,  the  recital
provides no blanket derogation for compulsory retirement.[xxi]
On the issue of legitimate aim, the  Court  confirmed  that  a  state  measure  need  not  express  its  social  or
employment policy purpose, so long as there is evidence that the policy exists. But it took a generous view of the facts
to associate the transitional measure with an employment policy. An equally valid view of  two  provisions  passed  at
the same time, with only one expressly demanding an  employment  policy,  is  that  the  other  (ie  the  transitional
measure) was not intended to fulfil an employment policy. This view is reinforced by the evidence
that during the interim  Government  policy  was  to  discourage  retirement  in  order  to  save  on
pension  costs,  and  that  transitional  measure  was  intended  purely  to  resolve  the  backlog   of
disputes.[xxii]
On the question of whether the measure was ‘appropriate and necessary’, the first  thing  to
note is that the court applied the state’s  ‘broad  discretion’  by  acquiescing  in  what  the  Spanish
Government considered ‘reasonable’.[xxiii] This endorses the Opinion  of   the  Advocate  General,
who said:
Indeed, as a rule, it cannot be for the Court of Justice to substitute its own assessment of such complex issues
for that of the national legislature or the other political and societal forces involved  in  the  definition  of  the
social and employment policy of a particular Member State (such as the social partners in  the  present  case).
At most, only a manifestly disproportionate national measure should be censured at this level.[xxiv]
This suggests that the court was willing to interfere only if the transitional  measure  went  beyond
the bounds of reason, rather than if it were  merely  disproportionate.  This  approach  contrasts  to
that taken in the Court’s only other  judgment  on  state  derogation  from  the  age  discrimination
principle, Mangold v. Helm,[xxv]  where  it  was  held:  ‘the  principle  of  proportionality  requires
every derogation from an individual right to reconcile, so far as  is  possible,  the  requirements  of
the principle of equal treatment with those of  the  aim  pursued.’[xxvi]  It  is  ironic  then,  that  the
Palacios de la Villa court cited Mangold in support of affording  the  state,  employers,  and  trade
unions, a broad  discretion  in  their  choice  and  definition  of  measures  capable  of  achieving  a
legitimate social or employment policy.[xxvii]
Second, the application of this  principle  signals  a  departure  from  the  stricter  approach
taken  in  previous  discrimination  cases.  In  the  equal  pay  case,  R  v.  Secretary  of   State   for
Employment, ex p. Seymour-Smith (1999)[xxviii] the ECJ acknowledged a state’s broad  margin  of
discretion,  but  observed  that  for  objective  justification,  ‘mere  generalisations  concerning  the
capacity of a specific measure  to  encourage  recruitment  are  not  enough.’[xxix]  This  view  was
applied  in  Mangold  v.  Helm.[xxx]  Here,  German  law  exempted   from   regulation   fixed-term
employment  contracts  for  any  worker  over  52.  This  relaxation  of  protective  legislation  was
designed to encourage employers to recruit older workers. Its aim was to help  older  persons  find
jobs more easily.[xxxi] Of course, the more direct result of this measure was to remove  safeguards
for older workers,  who  could  now  be  employed  on  temporary  contracts  for  the  rest  of  their
working  lives.  In  a  spirit  less  sympathetic  to  the  state  derogation,  the  ECJ  observed:  ‘This
significant body of workers, determined solely on the basis  of  age,  is  thus  in  danger,  during  a
substantial  part  of  its  members’  working  life,  of  being  excluded  from  the  benefit  of  stable
employment.’[xxxii] The Court applied its established interpretation of ‘broad discretion’, and held
that the policy could not be objectively justified because it went beyond what was appropriate and
necessary to  help  unemployed  older  workers.[xxxiii]  The  Palacios  de  la  Villa  judgment  cited
neither Seymour-Smith nor this part of Mangold.
If this established approach had been adopted by the Palacios de la Villa court, vague  notions  such
as ‘the promotion of full employment  by  facilitating  access  to  the  labour  market’,  ‘promoting
intergenerational   employment’,   or   (as   stated   in    the    collective    agreement)    ‘promoting
employment’, would require specific evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of  the  transitional
measure, and to justify its blatant discriminatory effect. If one accepts the measure  was  passed  to
fulfil an employment policy, the method chosen appears fallacious  and  rather  disingenuous.  For
instance, ‘checking unemployment’  by  retiring  older  workers  is  not  creating  more  jobs,  it  is
redistributing them to younger workers. The unemployment  figures  may  fall,  but  only  because
those laid off and now  unemployed  are  reclassified  as  ‘retired’.  To  aggravate  the  matter,  the
victims  of  this  manoeuvre  are  those  most  in  need  of  protection  from  age  discrimination,  a
mischief that the  age  strand  of  the  directive  was  designed  to  address.  As  such,  the  measure
appears neither appropriate nor necessary.
This broader version of proportionality carries technical problems as well. Although,  for  age,  the  Directive
departs from the norm  and  extends  the  objective  justification  defence  to  direct  discrimination,  nothing  in  the
directive suggests that that  the  defence  itself  is  less  stringent.  Article  6  reproduces  the  well-
established formula for objective justification, which was restated in  Mangold.  The  extension  of
the defence to direct discrimination suggests that the directive  has  accounted  for  any  distinctive
characteristics  of  age  discrimination.  The  only  modification  implied  by  article  6,  is  that  by
permitting justification of direct discrimination,  the  legitimate  aim  need  not  be  irrespective  of
age.[xxxiv] The point is that the extra discretion intended for those defending age discrimination  is
expressed by the directive, and should not be extended further by the judiciary. This  is  especially
so where the extension is to facially discriminatory conduct associated with direct  discrimination,
which society and lawmakers alike  generally  consider  more  repugnant,  and  in  need  of  tighter
control.
The ECJ’s generous association of the challenged measure with an employment policy,  its
partial  citing  of  Mangold,  and  the  exceptionally  broad  discretion   afforded   to   the   Spanish
Government, all suggest that underlying the Court’s decision is that for age discrimination there is
a new deference to derogations from the equal  treatment  principle.[xxxv]  Whether  this  new  line
will be maintained is a mater of speculation. One useful reference may be  the  approach  taken  in
the United States, where age discrimination laws have been established for decades.
COMPULSORY  RETIREMENT   AND   AGE   DISCRIMINATION   IN   THE   UNITED
STATES
The most comparable stateside legislation is the federal Age Discrimination  in  Employment  Act
1967 (ADEA). Under this act, compulsory retirement is unlawful, although it is possible to retire a
worker by individual agreement. To understand how this works, a little  background  is  necessary.
The general default position is the employment-at-will doctrine, allowing employers to  dismiss  a
worker at any time for no reason.[xxxvi] Unlike the UK,  there  is  no  general  right  against  unfair
dismissal. A dismissal becomes unlawful, of course, if it is on  a  protected  ground,  such  as  sex,
race,  religion,  national  origin,  disability,  or  age.  In  this  context,   compulsory   retirement   is
dismissal on the ground of age.
The  ADEA  applies  to  employers  with  20  or   more   workers,   and   protects   only   those   aged   40   or
above.[xxxvii]  It  affords  the  familiar  direct  and  indirect  discrimination  models.[xxxviii]  The  Act
contains two defences. First, a bone fide occupational requirement (BFOR), which corresponds  to
the Framework Directive’s ‘genuine and determining occupational requirements’. Second, there is
a defence of ‘reasonable factors other than age’ (RFOA), which appears to be a less  strict  version
of the usual ‘business necessity’ defence used for indirect discrimination  on  other  grounds,  such
as sex and race, and the Framework Directive’s own ‘objective justification’ defence.[xxxix] Logic
dictates that this defence, referring to  factors  other  than  age,  cannot  be  used  to  defend  direct
discrimination,[xl] a major difference from the Directive.
Whatever doubts over the precise meaning and application of the RFOA defence, it is clear that  neither  this,
nor the BFOR defence, permit compulsory retirement. This is reinforced by s 4(f)(2) of the Act,  which  provides  that
no seniority system or employee benefit plan (such as an  occupational  pension)  ‘shall  require  or
permit   the   involuntary   retirement   of   any   individual   ...   because   of   the    age    of    such
individual’.[xli] There are two exceptions: employers may retire, without more, academics aged 70
with unlimited tenure, and ‘high-policy makers’ aged 65.[xlii]
The Act allows individual workers to waive their ADEA rights,  although  strict  rules  apply.  This  allows  a
worker to agree to retirement. A valid ADEA waiver must:
1. be in writing and be understandable;
2. specifically refer to ADEA rights or claims;
3. not waive rights or claims that may arise in the future;
4. be in exchange for valuable consideration;
5. advise the individual in writing to consult an attorney before signing the waiver; and
6. provide the individual at least 21 days to  consider  the  agreement  and  at  least  seven  days  to
revoke the agreement after signing it.[xliii]
If an employer requests an ADEA waiver  in  connection  with  an  ‘exit  incentive  programme  or
other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees’,  more  stringent
rules apply. The time limit for consideration is extended to 45 days, whilst notice must be given of
the ‘job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program,  and  the  ages  of  all
individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for
the program.’[xliv] This transparency is designed to prevent an employer obtaining unconscionable
waivers during a large scale lay-off, where workers would  otherwise  have  no  reason  to  suspect
that  age   was   a   factor.[xlv]   The   Supreme   Court   held   in   Oubre   v.   Entergy   Operations
(1998)[xlvi] that doctrines of equitable  estoppel  or  affirmation  of  a  voidable  agreement  cannot
undermine these waiver conditions. If the agreement is defective, the worker may bring an  ADEA
claim, even where she or he does not return the consideration, such as a severance payment.
The ADEA provides much less  scope  for  derogation  from  age  discrimination  than  the
European  Framework  Directive.  It  does  not  permit  direct  discrimination   to   be   objectively
justified. Compulsory retirement is unlawful. And although individuals may agree  to  waive  their
age discrimination rights, it is not possible for these rights to  be  bargained  away  in  a  collective
agreement (as held in Palacios de la Villa).
More generally  though,  there  is  a  broad  consensus  that  age  discrimination  should  be
treated less seriously than other grounds, such sex, race, religion and national  origin,  covered  by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. In Smith  v.  Jackson  (2004),  Stevens  J.,  a  long-standing
liberal in the Supreme Court, observed in his majority opinion:
Congress’ decision to limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision is
consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title  VII,
not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity  to  engage  in  certain  types  of
employment. ... Thus, it is not surprising that certain employment criteria that are routinely
used  may  be  reasonable  despite  their  adverse  impact  on  older  workers  as   a   group.
Moreover, intentional discrimination on the  basis  of  age  has  not  occurred  at  the  same
levels as discrimination against those protected  by  Title  VII.  While  the  ADEA  reflects
Congress’ intent to give older workers employment opportunities  whenever  possible,  the
RFOA provision reflects this historical difference.[xlvii]
This theme of greater deference to  derogations  from  the  age  discrimination  principle  is
firmly established  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  constitutional  jurisprudence.  The  Equal  Protection
Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  or  Fifth  Amendments  provides  a  constitutional  guarantee  of  equal
protection of the laws.[xlviii] The Supreme Court has identified three  classes  of  protected  groups
under the Clause. First, the ‘suspect class’, who are  entitled  to  strict  scrutiny  of  the  challenged
law. Second, the ‘quasi-suspect class’, who are entitled to intermediate,  or  ‘heightened’  scrutiny.
And third, a residual, or ‘normal,’ class, who are entitled to ‘normal’ scrutiny,  where  a  law  need
only be ‘rational’. Age falls into the residual class, because older people  have  not  experienced  a
‘history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique  disabilities  on  the  basis  of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.’[xlix] Hence, it  was  constitutional
for a state to retire police officers  at  50,[l]  as  was  the  ADEA’s  exclusion  of  elected  and  high
ranking officials, such as judges, permitting a state to retire judges at 70.[li]
DISCUSSION
Although the American experience presents a picture of  greater  deference  to  age  discrimination
derogations, the matter is not quite so simple. The closest equivalent to the  Framework  Directive
is the ADEA. Its very limited waiver provision has been policed strictly by the Supreme Court,  as
shown  in  Oubre.  Stevens’  J.  dicta  in  Smith  v.  Jackson  is  rooted  in  the  differently   worded
legislative formula for justification. The Court has favoured derogation only  when  it  is  provided
in the legislation, either expressly in the ADEA, or by the open-ended  rubric  of  the  constitution.
These constitutional challenges are more akin to  a  petition  under  the  European  Convention  on
Human  Rights,  where  governments  generally  are  afforded  more  discretion   than   under   EU
legislation.
Thus,  the  American  experience  reveals  that  at  federal  level,  there  is  a  strict  judicial
adherence to the legislation. Further, the most comparable legislation, the ADEA,  provides  much
less scope than the Framework Directive for compulsory retirement. There  is  nothing  in  the  US
experience to underpin the approach taken in Palacios de la Villa.
One  way  of  explaining  this  tolerance  of  direct  age  discrimination,  be  it  statutory  or
judicial, is by a common theme of benign motive and consent. The ADEA’s waiver provision  and
RFOA defence, the constitutional tolerance of  age  discrimination,  article  6  of   the  Framework
Directive, and the Palacios de la Villa decision  all  suggest  that  the  law  is  tolerates  direct  age
discrimination that contains an element of benign motive. In  the  past,  the  ECJ  has  shown  little
sympathy for benign-motive sex discrimination.[lii] In Palacios de la Villa however, the  evidence
of the measure being made with the instigation, or cooperation,  of  trade  unions  and  employers’
groups clearly influenced  the  court.[liii]  By  contrast,  one  would  expect  the  law  to  be  highly
intolerant of an agreement  to  dismiss  a  worker  on  racial  grounds,  for  instance,  an  employer
paying  off  a   hairdresser   because   his   customers   ‘prefer   white   girls’.   This   exposes   age
discrimination as belonging to a different legal class of wrongdoing from other  grounds,  such  as
race or sex. The  common  feature  to  the  ADEA  waiver  and  the  Spanish  measure  is  consent,
although the  consent  associated  with  the  Spanish  measure,  being  rooted  in  majority  rule,  is
somewhat diluted. Although the UK exemption arguably may have  been  enacted  with  a  benign
motive,  its  wholesale  nature   permits   any   employer   hostile   to   older   workers   to   ‘retire’
them,[liv] and as such it is a conspicuous non-member of the benign motive and consent club.
THE HEYDAY CHALLENGE
It is possible that the ECJ will revert to its previous jurisprudence  (expressed  in  Mangold)  come
the Heyday appeal. In which case, the challenge should succeed.  But  that  is  merely  speculation.
Further,  the  exemption  cannot  be  challenged  for  contravening  the  directive’s  non-regression
principle (article 8(2)), because the default retirement  age  cannot  adversely  affect  those  with  a
normal retiring age of over 65.[lv] More substantial prospects lie in distinguishing  Palacios  de  la
Villa and arguing that the exemption cannot be objectively justified.
The  Spanish  exemption  is  subject  to  the  worker’s  pension  qualification,  confined   to
collective agreements, and implemented with the support of trade unions  (so  incorporating  some
degree of consent by workers). By contrast, the UK exemption allows all employers to compel  its
workers to retire, without consideration of the worker’s  pension  qualifications;  and  without  any
level of agreement whatsoever, from its inception (at the instigation of employers) to its execution
(by employers).
When enacting the Age Regulations, the UK Government stated that the default retirement
age was made in pursuit of a legitimate aim of social policy, comprising two elements: employers’
workforce planning and the  stability  of  occupational  pension  schemes  and  other  work-related
benefits.[lvi] It is questionable whether this aim qualifies as a social policy,  because  it  is  to  help
individual employers and their benefit schemes. Further, at a time of a ‘pensions crisis’, caused by
the ever-increasing proportion of retired persons, and a skills shortage, the policy is  unconvincing
as a legitimate social aim. However, it is arguable that a compulsory retirement age has  a  broader
societal impact, such as a motivation for workers to save pre-retirement, and a  reduction  in  ‘job-
blocking’.[lvii] Given the ECJ’s deference to member states’ autonomy  in  social  matters,  it  may
well be that these relatively minor factors qualify the policy as a legitimate aim.
On the issue of proportionality, the UK Government  maintained  that  in  consultation  a  ‘significant’
number  of  employers  use  a   set   retirement   age   as   a   necessary   part   of   their   workforce
planning.[lviii] But the exemption covers  all  employers,  not  just  this  ‘significant’  number,  and
does not require that workforce planning is - to use the Government’s word - ‘necessary’.
                Second,  the  Government  claimed  that  its  consultation  showed  that  without  a   default
retirement age there was risk to the stability of pensions.[lix] No supporting evidence  or  extended
reasons were given,[lx] save that  otherwise,  ‘Some  employers  would  instead  simply  reduce  or
remove benefits to  offset  the  cost  of  providing  them  to  all  employees,  including  those  over
65’.[lxi] The implication is that without the default retirement exemption workers would be  worse
off, as employers would prefer to cut benefits rather than face litigation.  This  is  a  tired  industry
mantra, that employment rights are bad for workers. Other failed excuses include: the  expense  of
equal pay will cause unemployment, or  maternity  rights  will  encourage  employers  not  to  hire
women.  Moreover,  it  is  the  type  of  ‘mere  generalisation’  rejected  by  the  ECJ  in  Seymour-
Smith.[lxii] On the face of it, pension schemes should not suffer if workers  carry  on  working  and
either draw their pensions, or defer entitlement and continue to contribute to  the  scheme.  This  is
especially so with the increasingly common ‘defined contribution’ schemes, where  the  payout  is
governed by the size of the fund, rather than external  factors,  such  as  the  final  salary  used  for
‘defined benefit’ schemes. Of course, situations  may  arise  where  forced  retirement  becomes  a
necessary consequence of preserving the pension scheme, say where a  restructuring  may  compel
workers to retire to qualify for the more generous old scheme.[lxiii] Again, the exemption goes  far
beyond what is necessary to address these situations.
A more proportionate solution would be to provide two  narrower  exemptions,  for  where
the retirement is in connection with  workforce  planning,  and  the  stability  of  pension  or  other
benefit schemes.  No  objective  justification  would  be  necessary.  This  rather  loose  exemption
would at least prevent the habitual or casual retirement of workers for no good reason,  as  well  as
‘age-hostile’ retirements. Employers would  need  to  show  a  (genuine)  connection  between  the
retirement and its workforce planning, or  pension/benefit  scheme.  An  even  more  proportionate
solution would be to remove the exemption altogether, save  expressing  workforce  planning  and
pension/benefit  stability  as  legitimate  aims  in  the  Age  Regulations.  This  would  compel   an
employer to objectively justify its retirement policy and allow compulsory retirement  only  where
it is appropriate and necessary for its particular aim.
A national default retirement age goes far beyond what  is  appropriate  and  necessary  for
the workforce-planning needs of  just  a  ‘significant’  number  of  employers,  or  to  preserve  the
stability of just some pension or other benefit schemes. The scope for misuse of this exemption  is
enormous, and far beyond that provided  by  the  Spanish  transitional  measure.  The  ECJ  took  a
significant step away from  its  objective  justification  jurisprudence  in  Palacios  de  la  Villa.  It
would have to take a yet further step to reject the Heyday challenge.
CONCLUSION
The availability of the objective justification defence for direct age discrimination  marks  out  age
discrimination as a lesser wrong than discrimination on other grounds,  such  as  sex  or  race.  The
ECJ’s generous interpretation of the facts and unusually broad  discretion  afforded  may  signal  a
new extended tolerance of age discrimination, but the contrast with Mangold, its  only  other  case
on the issue, makes this a more tentative statement.
Tolerance of age discrimination accords with the broad picture  in  the  United  States,  but
closer  analysis  reveals  that  the  most  comparable  legislation  does  not  allow  for   compulsory
retirement, and the judiciary afford discretion only where legislation so provides. Unlike  the  ECJ
in Palacios de la Villa, the US  Supreme  Court  has  not  extended  any  derogations  provided  by
legislation, in fact it has strictly policed the waiver provision.
The  Heyday  challenge  is  distinguishable  from  Palacios  de  la  Villa   because   of   the
draconian nature of the UK exemption, which contains no element of consent and  permits  casual,
habitual, and even age-hostile, retirements. For the Heyday challenge to fail, the ECJ  would  have
to take a yet further step away from its established jurisprudence of objective justification, as  well
as from that established in the United States.
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